A double-dip recession in politics

“If everything seems to be going well,

you have obviously overlooked something”

Murphy’s Law

In economics, a double-dip recession is a particular type of a downturn, which takes the form of a letter W, if plotted. One can plot any economy-related metric - for example, the level of unemployment, or the cost of assets or the market index. In any recession, the value of the metric drops swiftly, hits a bottom and bounces back. It seems that the recession is ebbing and a recovery is imminent. For a time the metric goes up, but it can suddenly snap and go down again, to hit the bottom one more time or maybe fall even lower. This is a double-dip recession, a nightmare of all politicians and economists: an illusion of recovery, followed by a new wave of crisis.

Double-dip recession is a strictly economy-related term because the corresponding phenomenon was first observed and described in the field of the economics. This does not mean, however, that the same phenomenon cannot manifest itself in other areas of human endeavor - for example in politics, which is closely linked to the economy.

It is the double-dip recession analogy that comes to mind when one looks at today’s state of the Russian society, Russian politics and recent Russian history (meaning the history of the Soviet Union). The Soviet Union has dissolved due to a crash of its inefficient economy and stagnation of its society. It seemed that the changes that took place afterwards have completely altered the course of country’s development, both economic and political, so that the crash seemed an isolated event: the Soviet Union (which was essentially the last incarnation of the Russian Empire) has gone, while invigorated Russia, leaving the crisis behind, has entered a new historical period.

But the latest developments in domestic and international politics (Ukrainian crisis, annexation of Crimea, a tidal wave of anti-liberal domestic laws), make one question this assumption. Have things been really going well, or we have overlooked something? Has Russia really been modernized following the collapse of the Soviet Union? Or has it remained essentially the same, retaining most of the Soviet Union’s defects, and it is only the setting that has changed, occasioning only limited adjustments in the country?

After all, the double-dip recession phenomenon takes place because the first dip of a recession does not facilitate enough changes in the economy (or society) to rid it of the problems which have led to the crash. The downturn can slow for a time or even reverse itself due to emergency measures or external circumstances, and observers may conclude that the crisis is over. But they may be overlooking some important details. Often it is not at all easy to notice them or to correctly appraise their importance because this requires genuine penetration. On top of this, in politics there is an additional factor of time scale: related events can be so spaced out in time that people may have trouble appraising them, because by the measures of history, human life is simply not long enough to experience such events as related to each other.

Not many people have had a success forecasting a second recession dip even in economic, but in this field people at least have the habit of watching out for it. In politics, on the other hand, hardly anybody thinks of it, probably because few politicians remain active long enough to be involved in both dips. But sometimes such forecasts happen in politics too.

The most salient - as well as the most terrible - example that I can recall is that of Hans von Seekt, the Chief of the German General Staff in 1919-1926. Von Seekt oversaw the reorganization of the German army after its defeat in the First World War; he laid the groundwork for the Reichswehr and built une Grande Armee en miniature1. Though limited by the Treaty of Versailles to only 100,000 men, the new German Army, built by him, was indeed grand.

Von Seekt was no politician himself, but being for an extended period of time a close witness to the political process, he had a chance to reflect on it in ways which were alien to the actual politicians. As far back as 1917 von Seekt foresaw2 that the First World War was going to be only the first phase of the unfolding world conflict, and that it would be followed by another, decisive phase. It was for this phase that he was preparing the new German army, and our country had an unfortunate occasion to feel itself how well he has succeeded in this.

Nobody knows exactly how von Seekt arrived at his conclusions, but looking back we can now see that first, he was completely right in his predictions. Of course it is easy for us to see this, having the benefit of hindsight, but would his contemporary politicians have believed such a prediction? And was there any politician who stayed in the game long enough to cover the span between 1917 and 1939? Hardly anyone - except Churchill, of course.

Next, we can now see that the First World War did not really change Germany enough to let her avoid the second dip. Prussian militarism, which was a significant factor in starting the First World War, was not eradicated. Both before and after that war, the military in Germany was a caste of narrow-minded professionals, fully available for any use by the politicians. Both before and after the war the German society was politically inactive and apt to follow a single leader, no matter where he led. Liberalism and political tolerance had quickly lost their appeal to the masses under the stress of post-war economic crisis. This mood had quickly produced a Fuehrer, who made full use of the professional military, and then Germany experienced the “second dip”, and her “political recession” turned into a “double-dip political recession”. It was only after WWII that the Germany finally got rid of the root causes of its recessionary problems, and only thanks to her victors having completely rebuilt her society, almost banning the military, wrenching East Prussia from her (Churchill consider it the cradle of Prussian militarism), and building a new political system, copied from Western democracies in West Germany. All in all, the recovery from the crisis has been extremely difficult, painful and expensive.

And so, looking at reactionary tendencies in Russian politics and social life, I cannot help asking myself - aren’t we edging towards the second dip of disintegration of the Russian Empire? Once we had already hit the bottom in the process of disintegration - back in 1991. After that Russia had seemingly taken to the path of modernizing itself and stepping away from political and economic crisis. But the return to openly imperialistic foreign policies - the annexation of Crimea, stirring insurrection in Ukraine, the rise of reaction in domestic politics and - most important - the political insensitivity of the Russian society, which lets the government loose for any tomfoolery, make one wonder: has this modernization only been a short break, similar to what the Treaty of Versailles had been for Germany? If this is the case then Russia is now approaching a cliff of a new political and economic, all-encompassing recession.

What would falling off this cliff mean to Russia? It is not possible to foretell how exactly the events would unfold, but the outcomes are quite predictable. The political recession would mean an extreme curtailing of the political and economic freedom of the Russian people: the emergence of censorship of the internet, a ban on foreign travel, a ban on free currency conversion. The economic recession would quickly lead to impoverishment of the majority of people. The lowered level of consumption would quickly lead to collapse of trade and domestic production, and then the economic crisis would develop into a state crisis. It is not pleasant to think of the scenarios it may lead to, but if it would be possible to avoid them by the script of 1991 - for example by returning Crimea to Ukraine, separating the Caucasus, etc. - I would consider it a bargain.

Would you say this is too far-fetched? I bet the same would have been said by any German in 1933, if he were told that in just 12 years East Prussia would become a part of the Soviet Union. That Koenigsberg would be called Kaliningrad, and Tilsit would bear the name of Sovetsk. That Germany would be split into two parts, hostile to each other, and that Berlin would be divided by a concrete wall. Nobody in Germany would have believed this in 1933. No war was on the horizon back then, Germany was only starting her quest for lost territories, and even the Communist Party was not banned back then. No one had understood that the country was just about to fall off the cliff into a catastrophic state-wide recession.

In the time since 1933 the world has experienced quite a number of double-dip recessions in the economy, but only a few in politics. Because of this people are not yet in the habit of watching out to make sure that a single-dip crisis in the political life does not develop into a double-dip crisis. It is likely that this habit will yet develop, but I would not like Russia to supply a case study for that. To avoid this, we need to rid ourselves of the defects which had brought about the fall of the Soviet Union: political listlessness, imperialistic ambitions and the greed for territories, the over-concentration of power. These defects will continue eating into Russia until they are eliminated. The choice we have now is between eradicating them by ourselves or letting the historical process do the job. Now we still have a chance to act, but if we won’t then history will take over, as it did in Germany. In this case we will have no other thing to do but to survive its working - as best as we can.

1 “The Great Army” was the name of Napoleon’s army that invaded Russia in 1812.

2 “History of German General Staff”, Walter Goerlitz, New York 1955, ASIN B000KNWQ4U

Crimea - self-determination or annexation?

The first round of Russo-Ukrainian conflict has ended in the detachment of Crimea from Ukraine and its incorporation into Russia. It looks so simple: Crimea held a referendum which turned overwhelmingly pro-Russian, hence goodbye to Ukraine, welcome into Russia, and all of them lived happily afterwards. And for those worrying about scruples there is a nice precedent to refer to: the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia, which was upheld by western democracies in spite of the opposition of the Serbian government. So why worry about Crimea and what is the reason that American, European, and homegrown liberals are so concerned? Let’s consider whether Russia’s position in this crisis is as clean-handed as it may seem.

Crimea and Kosovo are by no means comparable. The difference is obvious: the presence of an self-interested motive. Russia had a strong motive to acquire Crimea, while western democracies apparently had no material motive in the Kosovo case. Even Albania (and Albanians are by far the largest ethnic group in Kosovo) made no move to incorporate Kosovo. (Come to think of it, Kosovo may not mean much to anybody - except people living there, of course.)

The distinction between having a self-interested motive for a particular action and not having any is very great indeed. In law, for instance, one and the same action performed with or without a motive will be judged completely differently. To give an example, if a city administration officer awards a contract without holding a bidding, his actions may be judged either as violation of business procedures (in case he has no self-interested motive), or as a criminal offence (in case a motive is there).

In the case of Kosovo the international community might have been rash to uphold its independence in violation of international practices. However, since nobody had a motive in this case, one can only decry the rashness of the action. In the case of Crimea, on the other hand, Russia had a clear motive to wrench it from Ukraine and incorporate it, and this is the reason for the international outcry. It simply does not look like self-determination, it very much looks like an annexation.

This impression gets all the stronger once you consider that Russia has never officially questioned the Ukrainian sovereignity over Crimea for the past twenty-odd years. To be sure, now and then one could hear grumbling about Crimea being a part of Ukraine by chance only, but there were never any state-level discussions about returning it to Russia. Of course no one could expect Ukraine to hand Crimea back at the first request, but even so Russia has never made any official claims to it. By virtue of this, Russia has acknowledged that Crimea is a part of Ukraine.

But suddenly Russia has caught a break: the Ukrainian government has toppled, creating a cause for an intervention and there you are: Crimea is now a piece of native Russian soil and we have to get it back without delay! And why there was never any talk about this for the past twenty-odd years? Just because there was never a chance for substantiating this claim. But given an opportunity we used it to the full!

This looks like an opportunistic annexation, and this is the reason for the international panic. After all, there are plenty of examples of countries consistently laying claim to a territory under a different sovereignty. Here is one: for the last 65 years China has considered Taiwan a “breakaway province” and does not recognize its independence. It matters nothing that for the time being there is no chance to bring this province back under Chinese control. One day China will get its chance to do that; it will use it, of course, and its position will be unassailable: Taiwan was a part of China, China has never acknowledged its separation and therefore it can claim Taiwan legally. Of course there will be a lot of talk about the right for self-determination, etc. but China will simply ignore it, and from the point of view of international law China will have some right on its side.

The Russian claim to Crimea is much less than China’s claim to Taiwan.  China has consistently and emphatically claimed its sovereignty over this and other offshore islands, while Russia made no complaint about the status of Crimea until an opportunity arose.

Of course one can claim that Russia has had no hand in the annexation at all, and all that happened is a will of Crimean people. I consider this a clumsy cover-up. The very speed that drove the referendum in Crimea betrays careful planning on the part of local officials. Consider that any out-of-turn elections in Russia are scheduled months in advance. Crimea is much smaller than Russia, and the scope of preparation is correspondingly smaller, but then the local officials have correspondingly less resources to leverage - and they also had to do their preparations obliquely, since this had to happen before the escalation. There is no chance this preparation could have been completed in less than a month, but in fact it was done in a week. The conclusion is simple: it was a well-rehearsed impromptu.

To be sure, there is no way one can prove this, just as one cannot prove the presence of Russian military in Crimea. The official Russian position is that all the military men whom we have seen in the news are local volunteers. Some of these military men even offered interviews and confessed to being locals. Sort of a volunteer militia, a landsturm. Could be, but have you ever seen real militia? You might have had, if you have seen Soviet or German war chronicles.  Volunteer militia is composed, first and foremost, of people belonging to different age groups. In contrast to this, all of the Crimean military men were obviously of the prime military age: between 20 and 40, and very strongly built too, which is not at all typical of militiamen. Their very well fitting uniforms were also very conspicuous. Have you ever seen a civilian  when first fitted into uniform? He looks like a scarecrow. The military men in Crimea looked anything but scarecrows: they were strongly-built, young men, wearing uniforms naturally. I have been to the army and I can give you my word that no newly drafted military unit looks so solid, and passing off those Crimean military people as volunteer militia is sheer mockery. I am convinced that the military we’ve seen in Crimea were professionals, and they could only be Russian military professionals.

If I can see these details, and make these conjectures, then so can anyone capable of considering the situation without a preconceived opinion. Invariably, such people are asking how to account for the appearance of professional military in Crimea, which obviously do not belong to Ukrainian forces? Remember that they started to show up even before the Russian Federation Council had approved using Russian military in Ukraine! What is happening here: self-determination or annexation?

And there is nothing conjectural about the seizure of Ukrainian navy ships by pro-Russian forces - Russian media is gloating over it. Let me ask you this: does the fleet, which is a military unit, also have a right for self-determination these days? Are there any precendents for this? How has it happened that the Crimean autonomy has voted for joining Russia, and has taken Ukrainian navy ships along with it - where is the connection? What should have Russia done if only Crimean self-determination were on the agenda? Apologise for the incident, of course, and return the ships back to Ukraine - perhaps offering a political refuge to the crews. There is a precedent for this, by the way: the case of the “Potemkin” battleship in 1905, taken to Romania by a rebellious crew and promptly returned to Russia. But the very point is that the Russian  story is not about self-determination. It is about picking up misplaced things. Crimea was certainly misplaced by being in Ukraine - go get it (self-determination will do for a cover-up). The fleet suddenly appeared misplaced - pick it up (nobody will notice in the turmoil). Are we done yet or there is something else to be had?

The Crimean situation has obviously served a dual purpose for Russia: to round up the territory and to even the scores with the US and EU for the Kosovo case - the latter has certainly wounded the politicians deep. Though achieving this goal required transgressing international law or mere decency, this does not seem to mean much to Russian politicians. After all, it is only the result that counts.