A double-dip recession in politics

“If everything seems to be going well,

you have obviously overlooked something”

Murphy’s Law

In economics, a double-dip recession is a particular type of a downturn, which takes the form of a letter W, if plotted. One can plot any economy-related metric - for example, the level of unemployment, or the cost of assets or the market index. In any recession, the value of the metric drops swiftly, hits a bottom and bounces back. It seems that the recession is ebbing and a recovery is imminent. For a time the metric goes up, but it can suddenly snap and go down again, to hit the bottom one more time or maybe fall even lower. This is a double-dip recession, a nightmare of all politicians and economists: an illusion of recovery, followed by a new wave of crisis.

Double-dip recession is a strictly economy-related term because the corresponding phenomenon was first observed and described in the field of the economics. This does not mean, however, that the same phenomenon cannot manifest itself in other areas of human endeavor - for example in politics, which is closely linked to the economy.

It is the double-dip recession analogy that comes to mind when one looks at today’s state of the Russian society, Russian politics and recent Russian history (meaning the history of the Soviet Union). The Soviet Union has dissolved due to a crash of its inefficient economy and stagnation of its society. It seemed that the changes that took place afterwards have completely altered the course of country’s development, both economic and political, so that the crash seemed an isolated event: the Soviet Union (which was essentially the last incarnation of the Russian Empire) has gone, while invigorated Russia, leaving the crisis behind, has entered a new historical period.

But the latest developments in domestic and international politics (Ukrainian crisis, annexation of Crimea, a tidal wave of anti-liberal domestic laws), make one question this assumption. Have things been really going well, or we have overlooked something? Has Russia really been modernized following the collapse of the Soviet Union? Or has it remained essentially the same, retaining most of the Soviet Union’s defects, and it is only the setting that has changed, occasioning only limited adjustments in the country?

After all, the double-dip recession phenomenon takes place because the first dip of a recession does not facilitate enough changes in the economy (or society) to rid it of the problems which have led to the crash. The downturn can slow for a time or even reverse itself due to emergency measures or external circumstances, and observers may conclude that the crisis is over. But they may be overlooking some important details. Often it is not at all easy to notice them or to correctly appraise their importance because this requires genuine penetration. On top of this, in politics there is an additional factor of time scale: related events can be so spaced out in time that people may have trouble appraising them, because by the measures of history, human life is simply not long enough to experience such events as related to each other.

Not many people have had a success forecasting a second recession dip even in economic, but in this field people at least have the habit of watching out for it. In politics, on the other hand, hardly anybody thinks of it, probably because few politicians remain active long enough to be involved in both dips. But sometimes such forecasts happen in politics too.

The most salient - as well as the most terrible - example that I can recall is that of Hans von Seekt, the Chief of the German General Staff in 1919-1926. Von Seekt oversaw the reorganization of the German army after its defeat in the First World War; he laid the groundwork for the Reichswehr and built une Grande Armee en miniature1. Though limited by the Treaty of Versailles to only 100,000 men, the new German Army, built by him, was indeed grand.

Von Seekt was no politician himself, but being for an extended period of time a close witness to the political process, he had a chance to reflect on it in ways which were alien to the actual politicians. As far back as 1917 von Seekt foresaw2 that the First World War was going to be only the first phase of the unfolding world conflict, and that it would be followed by another, decisive phase. It was for this phase that he was preparing the new German army, and our country had an unfortunate occasion to feel itself how well he has succeeded in this.

Nobody knows exactly how von Seekt arrived at his conclusions, but looking back we can now see that first, he was completely right in his predictions. Of course it is easy for us to see this, having the benefit of hindsight, but would his contemporary politicians have believed such a prediction? And was there any politician who stayed in the game long enough to cover the span between 1917 and 1939? Hardly anyone - except Churchill, of course.

Next, we can now see that the First World War did not really change Germany enough to let her avoid the second dip. Prussian militarism, which was a significant factor in starting the First World War, was not eradicated. Both before and after that war, the military in Germany was a caste of narrow-minded professionals, fully available for any use by the politicians. Both before and after the war the German society was politically inactive and apt to follow a single leader, no matter where he led. Liberalism and political tolerance had quickly lost their appeal to the masses under the stress of post-war economic crisis. This mood had quickly produced a Fuehrer, who made full use of the professional military, and then Germany experienced the “second dip”, and her “political recession” turned into a “double-dip political recession”. It was only after WWII that the Germany finally got rid of the root causes of its recessionary problems, and only thanks to her victors having completely rebuilt her society, almost banning the military, wrenching East Prussia from her (Churchill consider it the cradle of Prussian militarism), and building a new political system, copied from Western democracies in West Germany. All in all, the recovery from the crisis has been extremely difficult, painful and expensive.

And so, looking at reactionary tendencies in Russian politics and social life, I cannot help asking myself - aren’t we edging towards the second dip of disintegration of the Russian Empire? Once we had already hit the bottom in the process of disintegration - back in 1991. After that Russia had seemingly taken to the path of modernizing itself and stepping away from political and economic crisis. But the return to openly imperialistic foreign policies - the annexation of Crimea, stirring insurrection in Ukraine, the rise of reaction in domestic politics and - most important - the political insensitivity of the Russian society, which lets the government loose for any tomfoolery, make one wonder: has this modernization only been a short break, similar to what the Treaty of Versailles had been for Germany? If this is the case then Russia is now approaching a cliff of a new political and economic, all-encompassing recession.

What would falling off this cliff mean to Russia? It is not possible to foretell how exactly the events would unfold, but the outcomes are quite predictable. The political recession would mean an extreme curtailing of the political and economic freedom of the Russian people: the emergence of censorship of the internet, a ban on foreign travel, a ban on free currency conversion. The economic recession would quickly lead to impoverishment of the majority of people. The lowered level of consumption would quickly lead to collapse of trade and domestic production, and then the economic crisis would develop into a state crisis. It is not pleasant to think of the scenarios it may lead to, but if it would be possible to avoid them by the script of 1991 - for example by returning Crimea to Ukraine, separating the Caucasus, etc. - I would consider it a bargain.

Would you say this is too far-fetched? I bet the same would have been said by any German in 1933, if he were told that in just 12 years East Prussia would become a part of the Soviet Union. That Koenigsberg would be called Kaliningrad, and Tilsit would bear the name of Sovetsk. That Germany would be split into two parts, hostile to each other, and that Berlin would be divided by a concrete wall. Nobody in Germany would have believed this in 1933. No war was on the horizon back then, Germany was only starting her quest for lost territories, and even the Communist Party was not banned back then. No one had understood that the country was just about to fall off the cliff into a catastrophic state-wide recession.

In the time since 1933 the world has experienced quite a number of double-dip recessions in the economy, but only a few in politics. Because of this people are not yet in the habit of watching out to make sure that a single-dip crisis in the political life does not develop into a double-dip crisis. It is likely that this habit will yet develop, but I would not like Russia to supply a case study for that. To avoid this, we need to rid ourselves of the defects which had brought about the fall of the Soviet Union: political listlessness, imperialistic ambitions and the greed for territories, the over-concentration of power. These defects will continue eating into Russia until they are eliminated. The choice we have now is between eradicating them by ourselves or letting the historical process do the job. Now we still have a chance to act, but if we won’t then history will take over, as it did in Germany. In this case we will have no other thing to do but to survive its working - as best as we can.

1 “The Great Army” was the name of Napoleon’s army that invaded Russia in 1812.

2 “History of German General Staff”, Walter Goerlitz, New York 1955, ASIN B000KNWQ4U